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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Plaintiff does not dispute defendant's statement.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE BELOW
Plaintiff does not dispute defendant's statement.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
POINT I
UTAH DIVORCE COURTS MUST RETAIN BROAD, EQUITABLE POWERS
TO ALLOCATE THE BENEFITS AND SUCCESSES AS WELL AS THE
DEBTS AND LIABILITIES OF THE MARRIAGE.
DUE PROCESS
REQUIRES CATEGORIES AND DEFINITIONS THAT ARE FLEXIBLE
TO ACHIEVE FAIRNESS.
POINT II
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS* REMEDY OF "EQUITABLE
RESTITUTION" IS A SOUND AND CREATIVE REFINEMENT TO
FASHION AN EQUITABLE RESULT WHERE A MAJOR INVESTMENT IN
HUMAN CAPITAL BY BOTH PARTIES HAS RESULTED IN A
POTENTIAL FOR SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED EARNINGS FOR ONE
PARTY BUT NO BENEFIT, UNDER A TRADITIONAL ASSET
DISTRIBUTION, TO THE OTHER PARTY.
POINT III
BY ALLOCATING THE "EQUITABLE RESTITUTION" FIRST AND
THEN THE ALIMONY (IF ANY) AND CHILD SUPPORT, THE TRIAL
COURT CAN EASILY ACHIEVE AN EQUITABLE RESULT.

iv

POINT IV
SINCE THE EVIDENCE USED BY THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS TO
AWARD INCREASED ALIMONY, INCREASED CHILD SUPPORT, AND
EQUITABLE RESTITUTION WAS ALL PRESENTED AT THE TIME OF
TRIAL, THE APPEALS COURT DECISION SHOULD BE MADE
RETROACTIVE TO THE TIME OF TRIAL TO AVOID THE HARSH
RESULT OF PLAINTIFF HAVING LIVED WITH INADEQUATE
AMOUNTS FOR THE THREE YEARS OF THE APPEALS PROCESS.
POINT V
PLAINTIFF HAVING CARRIED A SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL BURDEN
IN BRINGING A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE LAW TO RESOLVE
INEQUITITIES IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT, SHE SHOULD BE
AWARDED A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION TOWARD HER COSTS AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES THROUGHOUT THIS PROCESS.

V

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KAREN C. MARTINEZ,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
i
1

JESS M. MARTINEZ,

Case No. 880189-SC
Priority No. 13

Defendant/Petitioner.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF PARTIES AND TERMS
In the interest

of brevity and precision

the

following

shorthand terms will be utilized in lieu of the bulkier, yet more
precise definitions.
A.

PLAINTIFF:

In this action Karen

C. Martinez

was

plaintiff at the trial, appellant during the appeal at the Utah
Court of Appeals, and

is presently

respondent

on certiorari

before this court.
B.

DEFENDANT:

Jess M. Martinez was defendant at the trial,

respondent on appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, and petitioner
on certiorari before this court.
C.
describe

HUMAN CAPITAL:

The term utilized

by economists to

the decision by rational persons to forego current

income or benefits in order to invest in training, education or
other intellectual improvement which will significantly increase
potential earnings to the individual or individuals in which the
investment has been made.

The term reflects the similarity in

thought

processes associated with decisions made to invest in

tangible capital goods and in intellectual capital, both of which
lead

to increased

future income, which is the measure of the

increased productivity and the return on the investment.
trial

on

this

matter

plaintiff's

expert

witness

At the

provided

uncontroverted testimony that this concept was generally accepted
within the field of economics and that the concept was so well
accepted that it had evolved into a major subdiscipline within
the field.

(Trial Transcript page 79 lines 5-13, hereinafter

"TT 79, 5-13"; TT 85, 11-23; TT 86, 10-22.)
D.

BENEFITTED

SPOUSE:

That

spouse

upon

whom

the

education, training or license has been conferred as a result of
a marital

decision

to defer

current

consumption in order to

invest in "HUMAN CAPITAL" with the intention that the family will
enjoy a substantially

increased future standard of living as a

result of the increased earning power vested in that spouse as a
result of that investment.
E.

CONTRIBUTING

BENEFITTED

SPOUSE who

SPOUSE:

The husband

has contributed

or wife

to the Human

of

the

Capital

investment effort by sacrificing his or her current standard of
living in return for the prospect of a higher family standard of
living

in

financial

the

future.

These

contributions, where

contributions

can be

direct

that spouse's income actually

defers some or all of the actual costs of schooling or other
training.

However, such contributions are more likely to be

indirect, in the form of a reduced standard of living during the
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investment phase, the carrying of a disproportionate share of the
family responsibilities during the investment phase, or perhaps
foregoing career enhancement opportunities, all for the purpose
of facilitating the investment in the benefitted spouse.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Due to the significant misstatements of fact in defendant's
brief, plaintiff accepts that statement only to the extent that
defendant's statement of fact is not corrected hereunder.

Of

the misstatements, those deemed relevant to the issues before the
court are corrected as follows:
A.

MARITAL

HISTORY:

Plaintiff

accepts

defendant's

statement of the marital history with the following exceptions:
The parties never moved to Hill Air Force Base.

Defendant was

employed at Hill Air Force Base during the second year of the
parties1 marriage and earned between $8,000 and $9,000 that year.
(TT 5.)

From 1968 through 1977 plaintiff was employed for the

first one and one-half years until the parties moved to Germany.
(TT 29, 5-13.)

In addition, she bore all three of the parties1

children during that period, Brent on October 1, 1970, Ryan on
August

31, 1971 and Heather on May 29, 1975.

Plaintiff began

working again when defendant went to college and worked six more
years including through defendant's medical school.
19.)

3

(TT 34, 13-

In

his

presentation

of

income

figures

on his

chart,

defendant conveniently omits the three years of medical school
during

which

time

he

was

not

employed

other

than

in

the

educational investment undertaken in pursuit of his anticipated
profession.
f,

D/P B 4".)

(Defendant/Petitioner's brief page 4, hereinafter
Plaintiff worked outside of the home for all three

of those years, although her earning capacity was admittedly
limited by the three small children.
waitress and

She worked as a hostess,

in other positions for which income is generally

meager, but for which the hours of employment were suitable to
her requirement to care for the three children during the daytime hours while defendant was engaged in his schooling efforts.
(TT 34, 13-19.)
Defendant's statement in his brief that "plaintiff did not
work except in 1978, 1979 and 1980 when she was employed as a
part-time waitress" (D/P B 5) ignores two of the years that she
worked

outside

the home, unfairly

ignores all of the support

functions provided by plaintiff during the educational process,
and

ignores

opportunities
Pennsylvania.
house at first

the
by

limitations
defendant

placed

after

the

on

her

parties

employment
moved

to

Defendant moved the family to an isolated farm
where no work was available

(TT 36, 2-8) and

after he moved them to a bigger city, he told her she could not
work at Burger King (TT 37, 2-4) or at Gysinger Clinic (TT 37,
14-15).

Her diligent efforts to find work elsewhere were futile

(TT 7, 16-23; 36, 14-24.)

Defendant also ignores the sacrifices

4

made by plaintiff and the children during the fifteen years of
education and he attempts to limit the court's attention strictly
to the outside earnings of the parties during the marriage.
Plaintiff does not attempt to place any inordinate value on
her meager earnings during the marriage, nor has she done so
throughout any of the prior proceedings on this matter.

However,

the record is clear and documented by the findings of the trial
court

that

she

provided

substantial

non-monetary

support

necessary for defendant to complete the educational and training
process,

and

that

she

and

the

children

made

significant

sacrifices in their standard of living during that fifteen year
process
directed

which would

not

have been necessary

all of his efforts

standard of living.

had

defendant

toward the family's then-current

Defendant's statement that "He also saved

money which was then used to support the family during the last
three years of medical school" (D/P B 5) chauvinistically implies
that plaintiff and the children made no sacrifices to facilitate
those savings.
Similarly, throughout his brief, defendant alleges that he
decided to obtain the college education, he decided to undertake
medical school and he incurred the student loans
total disregard
children.

At

. . . all in

of the sacrifices made by plaintiff and the
the

trial

and

throughout

these proceedings,

plaintiff acknowledged her reluctance to continue the significant
sacrifices that were required of her and the children in order to
continue the educational process.

5

However, the marriage did not

break

up at

that

time

sacrifices necessary
(TT 33, 13-21.)

because

plaintiff

did continue the

to support the HUMAN CAPITAL investment.

In his statement of facts, defendant

totally

ignores the tremendous emotional price paid by plaintiff during
the internship and residency when the family was required to live
in a small

and primitive

shack

in the rural

Pennsylvania

countryside with no telephone, no means of transportation, and no
adult association (TT 36, 2-4) nor the stress associated with her
having

total

responsibility

for the children on the minimal

budget upon which the family subsisted during that training while
the defendant was "working an exorbitant number of hours11 and on
call 36 hours at a time.
B.

(TT 19, 6-11.)

BREAKUP OF THE MARRIAGE:

Defendant's statement of facts

as to how the marriage broke up omits several relevant factors
and seriously misstates others.

Plaintiff did object to the move

to Pennsylvania at the outset, as stated by defendant.

However,

the

isolated

court

facilities

should

keep

in mind

the primitive

and

to which plaintiff and the children were subjected

while defendant performed his internship.

(TT 36, 2-4.)

The

stress of this sacrifice was much less on defendant who was gone
for days at a time and who had numerous outside challenges and
associations at the hospital during this period.

(TT 19, 6-12.)

Defendant's statement of why plaintiff left Pennsylvania is
grossly misleading.

The actual

facts of that separation are

that defendant had been involved in an affair with another woman.
When plaintiff

found a love letter

6

from

the girlfriend and

confronted defendant with the same, he told her that he would not
give up the girl

friend, that he would not take part in any

marriage counseling, nor would he attempt to save the marriage.
(TT

20,

1-17;

18,

25

to

19, 5;

21, 2-3.)

Under

those

circumstances plaintiff and the children returned to Utah and
obtained a job within one week.
defendant would

Both parties still thought the

follow and practice

in Utah.

(TT 21, 4-6.)

Under the circumstances, to claim that she left defendant because
of the area and the lack of comfort is absurd.
who was granted
mental

the divorce from defendant on the grounds of

cruelty due to defendant's

female other than plaintiff."
of Law, Record

It was plaintiff

"consorting with an adult

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions

204, hereinafter

f,

R 204".)

The court made no

finding of desertion or mental cruelty on plaintiff's part.
C.

RESIDENT TRAINING:

performing

his residency

He was eight or nine months into

training

in emergency

medicine

in

Pennsylvania at the time that plaintiff and the children returned
to Utah.
D.

(TT 17, 16-18.)
DEFENDANT'S INCOME:

Defendant's statement of his income

and expenses implies that he incurred over $1,200 per month, or
approximately
expenditures

$15,000 per year

for professionally

such as malpractice insurance.

misrepresentation

required

This is a gross

of the evidence which was adduced at trial

which reflected a gross income of $8,333 per month and a total
annual

expenditure

malpractice

for business

required

expenses

such

as

insurance of $7,100, or less than $600 per month.
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(TT 9-12.)

Defendant also states that there was "nothing left in

the tax account after April 15th of each year".

(D/P B 7.)

In

actuality, defendant had not paid any taxes on his $100,000.00
per year income under the employment contract in effect at the
time of trial, but testified that he was putting that much into a
tax account in anticipation of the tax payment, based upon the
then current maximum tax rate of 50%.
E.

LIVING EXPENSES:

(TT 102, 15-22.)

Defendant's statement as to his living

expenses at the time of trial, while technically correct, implies
that he was paying a substantial sum toward his student loans and
thereby had monthly expenses of $4,337. (Defendant's exhibit 3, R
223.)

In actuality, the amount of his payment toward school

loans at the time of trial was minimal.

What he claimed for his

personal living expenses, excluding the temporary support paid to
plaintiff under the temporary order was nearly twice plaintiff's
total expenditures

for herself and the children based on the

temporary support and her limited income.
F, R 222.)

After

(Plaintiff's exhibit

the trial the parties1 second child, Ryan,

returned to Pennsylvania to live with defendant, and the trial
court

reduced

the total child support payable to plaintiff by

$100 per month as a result of that change.

(Hearing Transcript

8/29/85, R 200.)
F.

ADEQUACY OF EVIDENCE:

Further in his argument defendant

contends that "Mrs. Martinez failed to present adequate evidence
to support a finding that a medical degree was a marital asset;"
(D/P B 12, paragraph 2 ) .

In actuality, plaintiff qualified two

8

eminent experts Dr. Chris Lewis, Chairman of the Department of
Economics at Utah State University

(TT 77, 21-22) and David

Dorton, CFA, a business and financial analyst

(TT 61 and 62).

Both experts testified that the medical degree and license to
practice medicine were intangible property acquired as a result
of the parties 1

investment in human capital which conferred a

greatly increased income potential upon defendant.
TT 63-71.)

Defendant presented

no expert

(TT 82-87 and

testimony and the

testimony of plaintiff's two experts was neither controverted nor
undermined

on cross-examination.

testified

that

defendant

was

throughout

Plaintiff's expert further

the value of the human capital bestowed upon
quantifiable

the economic

utilizing

community.

techniques

accepted

(TT 79, 5-11.)

Using

conservative factors, the witnesses testified that the asset was
worth between 1.6 million and 1.9 million dollars.
82-84.)

(TT 71 and

The difference in valuation was explained by Dr. Lewis

at the trial to arise from the different figures utilized by the
witnesses in determining defendant's net income from the practice
(excluding

fixed

business

expenditures).

Mr. Dorton, who

testified first, based his calculations upon answers to earlier
interrogatories wherein Dr. Martinez estimated his expenditures
to be $10,000 per year.

After defendant's testimony at trial,

Dr. Lewis recalculated his evaluation based upon a total cost of
doing business of $7,100 per year.
The difference

in net

(TT 83, 21-25 and 84, 1-7.)

income before

taxes accounts

for the

$100,000 difference in valuation for defendant's expected work
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life, discounted to its then present value utilizing conservative
discount

factors.

(TT 80-82 and 91.)

This value is not the

value of defendant's total income during his life expectancy.
is

the value

of

education and
calculated

the additional

training

by deducting

received

income

attributable

to

It
the

during the marriage, and was

the average income for a high school

graduate of the same age from defendant's current and projected
income

(TT 83, 15-20).

(The average income for a high school

graduate utilized, from U.S. Government tables, was $33,600 per
year, (TT 83, 2-4) which is much higher than defendant's actual
pre-education

income

level of $8,000 to $9,000 per year, and

reflects the conservative nature of the calculations used by the
experts.

(See Mr. Dorton's testimony TT 63 through 71 and Dr.

Lewis' testimony TT 79 through 86.)
G.

EQUITABLE RESTITUTION:

Defendant's statement (D/P B 12)

that neither party had raised, argued or urged the creation of
the doctrine of equitable restitution is technically correct.
However, from the time that plaintiff filed her amended complaint
in this matter (R 4) through the interrogatory process, (R 59-62)
and

through the trial itself, plaintiff clearly requested from

the court a share of the greatly

increased

vested in defendant during the marriage.

income expectancy

(R 127-144, Plaintiff's

Trial Brief; TT 66 line 21 through 68 line 6; TT 113-124.)
term

equitable

restitution was

originated

by

the Court

The
of

Appeals in an attempt to solve the equitable dilemmas faced by
courts across the country in dealing with cases such as this one.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

POINT I

In an action for divorce the court has broad equity powers
to allocate the benefits and successes as well as the debts and
liabilities resulting from the joint actions of the family unit
prior to the breakup of the principal partners.
associated with this power

is essential

The discretion

to the due

process

function and should not be restricted nor distorted by unduly
restrictive historical

definitions and categories which have

evolved over the years to expedite judicial processing of divorce
cases.

POINT II

The remedy of "equitable restitution" fashioned by the Utah
Court of Appeals in this case is a sound and creative refinement
of

the

court's

equity

powers

to identify

and

allocate

the

deferred returns from a marital investment in human capital which
bestows on one of the partners a potential for substantially
increased future earnings.
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POINT III

In order to deal equitably with the allocation of intangible
marital assets the court may need to reorder the sequence in
which divorce issues are resolved.

POINT IV

In t h e i n t e r e s t
final

remedy

inequitable

of e q u i t y ,

fashioned

Decree

t h i s court should d i r e c t

on

appeal

of D i v o r c e

entered

to

correct

the

by t h e t r i a l

be made r e t r o a c t i v e t o May 3 1 , 1 9 8 5 , t h e d a t e of

that

the

harshly

court

should

trial.

POINT V

Plaintiff
bringing

about

jurisdiction
by

the

has

trial

contribution

clearly

a

necessary

in order
court
to

carried

to resolve
and s h o u l d

the

substantial

change

in

the

the inequities
thus

significant

incurred throughout the t r i a l

a

and a p p e l l a t e

and

law

of

of
this

imposed upon h e r

be awarded

costs

burden

a

substantial

attorney's

process.

fees

ARGUMENT

In order

to avoid

substantial redundancy in the material

presented to this court, plaintiff refers the court to Point I of
her

appellant's

brief

filed

in January,

1986.

That

brief

contains a thorough analysis of the case law up to the time that
the brief was filed.
brief.

Only more recent cases are included in this

It is clear that the courts of the various states have

experienced

considerable

difficulty

in

dealing

with

the

allocation of deferred returns from joint marital investments in
human

capital

which

bestow

upon

one

of

the

substantially increased future earning potential.

partners

a

The Utah Court

of Appeals has made commendable progress in this area by creating
the remedy of equitable restitution.

POINT I

IN AN ACTION FOR DIVORCE THE COURT HAS BROAD EQUITY POWERS
TO ALLOCATE THE BENEFITS AND SUCCESSES AS WELL AS THE DEBTS AND
LIABILITIES RESULTING FROM THE JOINT ACTIONS OF THE FAMILY UNIT
PRIOR TO THE BREAKUP OF THE PRINCIPAL PARTNERS.
ASSOCIATED WITH THIS POWER

IS ESSENTIAL

THE DISCRETION

TO THE DUE

PROCESS

FUNCTION AND SHOULD NOT BE RESTRICTED NOR DISTORTED BY UNDULY
RESTRICTIVE

HISTORICAL

DEFINITIONS AND CATEGORIES WHICH HAVE

EVOLVED OVER THE YEARS TO EXPEDITE JUDICIAL PROCESSING OF DIVORCE
CASES.
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The legal systems of this country and the State of Utah
inherently

provide

structure

and

predictability

to

the

interactions between our citizens while retaining the flexibility
to adapt to the social evolution of society.

Some changes, such

as those in the area of women's suffrage and civil rights have
been

major

and

highly

publicized

corrections

legislation and significant public input.

involving

Others, such as in

the field of equity, are more subtle and are carried out within
the court system without mass public participation.

The latter

is clearly the case as the courts across the country attempt to
deal with the distribution of the less tangible assets which have
been

jointly

marriage.

acquired

by

the

partners

to a now

bankrupt

As set forth in plaintiff's earlier brief, some courts

have attempted to classify these expectations of increased income
or intangible assets as "property" in order to fashion a means by
which both marital
investment.
significant

partners

can share

in the returns to the

As defendant points out in his brief, there has been
resistance

to categorizing

such

intangibles

as

property as a result of their lack of transferability and other
historic attributes of property.

Typical of that resistance, the

Colorado Supreme Court, in the Graham case
Graham,

(In Re Marriage of

574 P. 2d 75 [Colo. 1978]) stated that the educational

degree at issue therein did not

...

have an exchange value or any objective
transferrable value on an open market. It is personal
to the holder.
It terminates on the death of the
holder and is not inheritable. It cannot be assigned,
sold, transferred, conveyed or pledged. Ld. at 77.
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While

the Colorado Court recognized that the educational

degree requires a substantial investment of study time and effort
by the benefitted

spouse, they totally ignored the additional

effort, support and sacrifices made by the contributing spouse.
Having done that, the court dismissed the value of the increased
income potential

conferred

upon

the benefitted

spouse, and

denied Mrs. Graham what the trial court had originally awarded
her as a share of the discounted value of this flow of increased
future earnings.

(.Id. at 77.)

The court totally ignored the

investment decisions that had lead to the undertaking, and the
joint nature of the effort and sacrifices made by both partners
to bring about the resultant return on the investment.
Many

of

the states which

refused

to characterize

such

increased future earnings as property have attempted to reach an
equitable result by "reimbursing" the contributing spouse for her
efforts and sacrifices through an award of alimony based upon
the

increased

earnings

of

the

benefitted

plaintiff's original brief, Issue number 1.)

spouse.

(See

In order to avoid

the unfairness of such an allocation, (wherein the contributing
spouse's share of the joint

investment

in human capital

is

terminated by the non-related event of her remarriage) some of
the states have attempted to make all or part of the contributing
spouse's alimony non-terminable by his or her remarriage.

As

Judge Orme point out in the Appeals Court decision in the case at
bar, to award the contributing spouse regular alimony, terminable
upon remarriage, is to "force her to forego marriage and perhaps
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even be celibate for many years simply to realize a return on her
investments and sacrifices

. . . ."

Martinez v. Martinez, 754

P.2d 69 at 77, fn 9 (Utah App. 1988) citing Hubbard v. Hubbard,
603 P.2d 747 at 752 (Okla. 1979).

The glaring inequity of this

terminable alimony approach is further highlighted by the fact
that

after

benefitted

the remarriage
spouse

now

of

the contributing

receives

the

ent ire

investment which was made by both marital
resulting standards of living are very unequal.

spouse,

return

the

on

the

partners and

the

See citations on

original brief.
The non terminable alimony approach was alluded to by Judge
Orme in footnote 4 of the opinion in Peterson v. Peterson, 737
P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1987) at page 242 wherein he stated
In another kind of recurring case, typified by
Graham, where divorce occurs shortly after the degree
is obtained, traditional alimony analysis would often
work hardship because, while both spouses have modest
incomes at the time of divorce, the one is on the
threshold of a significant increase in earnings.
Moreover, the spouse who sacrificed so the other could
attain a degree is precluded from enjoying the
anticipated dividends the degree will ordinarily
provide.
Nonetheless, such a spouse is typically not
remote in time from his or her previous education and
is otherwise better able to adjust and to acquire
comparable skills, given the opportunity and the
funding.
In such cases, alimony analysis must become
more creative to achieve fairness, and an award of
"rehabilitative" or "reimbursement 11 alimony, not
terminable upon remarriage, may be appropriate.
See,
e.g. , Hauqan v. Haugan, 117 Wis.2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796
(1984); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527
(1982).
The approach suggested by Judge Orme is consistent with the
position taken by plaintiff in her original
to this court.

(appellant's) brief

At that time plaintiff came to the conclusion
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that, under

the then-existing

tax

laws,

the

non-terminable

alimony approach was the only way to equitably allocate the
benefits from the investment in human capital.

The primary basis

for such a position was that by making the payment alimony, the
speculative nature of the future income would be eliminated, with
both parties receiving their shares of the "return" as it was
actually

earned.

In addition, the tax attributable

portion of the income transferred
would

be shifted

to the

to the contributing spouse

to her as she received the payment.

If the

transfer had been treated as a transfer of a property asset, the
payment would have to have been made by the benefitted spouse
from

"after

tax dollars" thereby placing

the entire

income

package in the highest possible income tax bracket, and shifting
to the benefitted spouse an unreasonable tax burden which he or
she might not have been able mitigate through tax shelters.
With the change

in the taxability

of transfers between

parties to a divorce brought about by the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
the court now has the power to allocate the tax incidence of
transfer payments made pursuant to a divorce action in order to
achieve equity in the distribution.

As a result, the need to

term the transfer "alimony" in order to reach equity from the tax
angle is no longer existent, and the allocation can be dealt with
directly and without confusing normal alimony principles.

The

courts of this country have historically experienced very little
difficulty

in valuing and allocating tangible property assets,

including capital assets, acquired during a marriage.
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In those

cases

the courts do not

limit

their valuation

to the

mere

depreciated value of the capital property assets of the family
business, but value the business based upon its overall

future

income expectancy arising from that asset and other factors such
as goodwill.
The courts have also been able to allocate assets which are
primarily

intangible, but have both tangible and

characteristics.

intangible

The example used in plaintiff's initial brief

was a McDonald's franchise.

Although the investors might well

pay $500,000 to open a McDonald's franchise, less than half that
value would be attributed to tangible property assets, with the
remainder

of

the value

attributable

to goodwill

and

sales

promotions performed nationwide for the purpose of developing and
maintaining future income for all franchisees.

The courts have

no problem valuing that franchise at the time of a divorce, and
the value placed on the asset at that time would not be limited
to the actual cash inputs by each of the partners.

The value

would include the assets, the national goodwill that comes with
the

franchise

and

the

local

goodwill

attributable

to

the

successful operation of the store at issue, and reflected in the
income expectancy projections utilized by the valuation experts.
The most difficult assets for the courts to allocate have
been those which are entirely intangible, with none of the "hands
on" characteristics of tangible property.

These assets generally

have a value far in excess of the token value of any property or
certificate associated with the asset, and often contain elements
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of speculation and other uncertainties as to future payouts.

The

assets are admittedly more difficult to value, but at trial both
of plaintifffs expert witnesses testified, without contradiction,
that

such valuations

are possible

business and economic community.
courts

have

concluded

that

and

are accepted

by

(TT 63-65 and TT 79-88).
such

valuation

distribution is not only possible but required.

and

the

Other

equitable

In addition to

cases cited in original brief, see In re Marriage of Smith, 518
N.E.2d

450 at 457 (111. App. 1 Dist. 1987) where the Illinois

court held that
"(A)
contributing spouse is entitled to some form of
compensation for financial efforts and support provided
to the student spouse in the expectation that the
marital unit would prosper in the future as a direct
result of the couple's previous sacrifices."
The New York
partes

Supreme

Court

continues

to hold

that one

academic degree acquired during a marriage is marital

property subject to equitable distribution reasoning that just as
"a non-vested pension is an asset subject to equitable
distribution on divorce . . . . (s)o it should also be
with professional licenses and academic degrees.
Otherwise, with the simple stroke of serving a summons
i m m e d i a t e l y prior to graduation day, a spouse
contemplating divorce could prevent a spouse who
assisted in his or her spouses (sic) attaining such a
degree or license from receiving that which he or she
is entitled to . . . . Freyer v. Freyer, 524 N.Y.S.2d
197 149 (Sup. 1987).
Likewise, the Michigan Court of Appeals continues to hold
that,

following

original

brief) a professional

equitably
alimony.

its Woodworth decision

divided

either

(cited in plaintiff's

degree should

in the property

be valued

settlement

and

or as

Daniels v. Daniels, 418 N.W.2d 924 at 927 (Mich. App.
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1988).

See also Thomas v. Thomas, 417 N.W.2d 563 at 566 (Mich.

App. 1987) where the contributing spouse was awarded one-eighth
of the value of the student
valuation using
contributing

spouse's law degree, based on a

information known at the time of trial, the

spouse

having

also received

all equity

in the

parties1 home and the bulk of other martial assets.
In Greer v. Greer, 353 S.E.2d 427 at 431 (N.C. App. 1987)
the North Carolina Court found that the husband who sacrificed so
his

wife

could

compensation.

obtain
Under

her medical

degree was

entitled

to

the North Carolina statute, professional

licenses are separate property.

However, the statutory factors

used to determine an equitable result include "direct or indirect
contributions made by one spouse to help educate or develop the
career potential of the other spouse."

The court specifically

considered the contributing spouse's greater role in child care
and homemaking

duties

in making

the award.

In addition to

affirming that the contributing spouse deserved a cash award for
the value of his contribution, the court affirmed the trial court
awarding him the family home, despite the fact that he was not
the

custodial

parent,

to

make

the

property

distribution

equitable.
As with the goodwill of the McDonald's franchise, the value
of these

intangible assets is a direct function of the future

flow of income attributed to the asset.
have generally
expected

These valuation problems

been overcome by the courts

retirement

in dealing

with

benefits as was the case in Woodward v.
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Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982).

As set forth in Woodward,

the problems with speculation as to the duration of

future

retirement

can be

payouts

and

the amount

overcome by a structured

of such

payouts

payout of the benefits as they are

received by the marital partner on whom the intangible asset was
vested.

In essence, the Woodward case tells us that the non-

pensioned

(contributing) spouse is entitled to one-half of the

value of the pension which accrued to the pensioned (benefitted)
spouse during the course of the marriage.

In those cases it is

clear that the contributing spouse (non-pensioned spouse) should
receive one-half of the retirement payment as it is received, ij:
the retirement benefit accrued entirely during the time that the
parties were married, and if the court does not elect to place a
present value on the pension benefits and offset it with other
property accrued during the marriage partnership.
The courts have had the most difficultly in dealing with
valuation and distribution of human capital acquired during a
marriage and conferred

entirely upon one of the spouses.

In

essence, the marital effort is a partnership undertaking wherein
there is a significant shift of the marital resources to support
the investment in the education and training of the benefitted
spouse, to include a significant

shift

in the allocation of

domestic duties, such as care for the home and children, to the
contributing spouse.

The contributing spouse is also called upon

for direct contributions to the financial support of the family
during

the education

of the

benefitted spouse.
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Clearly,

the

problem is that the asset acquired as a result of this investment
is in the brain of the benefitted spouse.

That being the case,

it is impossible for the court to reach out and touch the asset
and perhaps somehow divide portions of the brain between the
parties.
Investment
retirements
parties.

decisions

involving

such tangible assets as

are not always clear even to the

participating

But, even in those cases the parties have often forgone

a different job with higher current wages or perhaps lived in a
less desirable location in order to secure the deferred benefit.
Closer

analysis

investment

of

the

process

shows,

however,

that

the

decisions made by the parties in the human capital

market are exactly the same as if the investment had been made in
a machine for a family business.
Defendant

urges

(TT 85, 11-23; 86, 7-22.)

this court

to take the narrow view of

"property", ignoring the economically accepted concept of Human
Capital

and

investment

the sacrifices by both parties
process

specialization.

to obtain

involved

in the

the medical degree, license and

Such a narrow approach would merely perpetuate

past inequities arising from problems which the courts have had
in grasping these relatively complex economic concepts.

Whether

saleable or not, the asset is the result of the joint investment
and acquired

as a result

of the conscious decisions by the

partners to make current sacrifices during the investment phase
of the process in order to reap the expected

future benefits.

The fact that these benefits take the form of an increased flow
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of income which vests in the brain of the benefitted party does
not change the reality of the decision process.
that

decision

is

that

the

parties

defer

The essence of
current

income,

expenditures and standard of living in order to bring about the
e x p e c tat i on

of

substantially

expenditures and standard
investment.
investment

As with

increased

future

income,

of living from the returns to that

the

case

of

capital

machinery,

the

decision is not made unless the expected return is

high enough to make the current sacrifices worthwhile.

In this

case, if the expected income level as a result of the investment
in human capital is not high enough to justify the sacrifices and
reduction

in current

standard

economically-oriented
investment.

of living, then the rational,

decision-maker

will not undertake

the

In the case of Dr. Martinez, the expectation was to

raise the family income from the $8,000 to $9,000 per year level
prior to his entry into the educational process to a level of
$100,000 or more per year, as was reflected

by his current

contract at the time of trial.
The
inequity

1987 Colorado

case cited by defendant recognized the

in the Graham decision, supra.

The Colorado Supreme

Court granted certiorari in In re Marriage of Olar, 747 P.2d 676
(Colo. 1987), because

its holding in Graham that an advanced

degree is not marital property brought a "harsh and often unfair
outcome" for the contributing spouse.
the "deferral of earning capacity
current

standard

The court recognized that

. . .

at the expense of the

of living of the couple" is made with "an
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expectation of a higher standard of living in the future."

The

contributing spouse, when the divorce comes before the fruits of
the

joint

investment

are

realized,

"is

left without

the

resources to recover from the years of deferring the acquisition
of property and security."

Recognizing that the "potential for

injustice" is great, the Colorado Court re-examined the issue.
Id at 678.
toward

The Court

took what was for Colorado a big step

equity by redefining the statutory

required

before awarding maintenance.

"threshold of need"

The Court held that,

rather than base a maintenance award on whether the requesting
spouse can meet his or her own "minimum requirements to sustain
life", the standard in the past, the courts should consider all
circumstances
"appropriate

including
employment"

"reasonable
can

be

needs"

found

and

whether

considering

the

contributing spouse's "reasonable expectations established during
the marriage."

Thus, the Court loosened its alimony analysis to

reach a more fair result.

Xd. at 681.

An unusually harsh court,

the Colorado Court did not decide until 1987 that a pension plan
is marital property.

In re Marriage of Grubb, 745 P. 2d 661 at

664 (Colo. 1987).
In his brief, defendant makes a point of the educational
debts which remain after the educational process, which he has
been ordered to pay.

Although the amount of this debt is greatly

exaggerated by defendant and is almost negligible compared to the
value of the education and training, plaintiff does not claim
that she should receive a share of the value of the Human Capital
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without consideration for the debt.

If the partnership had not

been dissolved by divorce the benefit which she and the children
would have received would have been on a net basis after the
payment of debts and costs of doing business, such as MaiPractice Insurance.

That is why these items were excluded from

the valuation formula utilized by the expert witnesses.

Taxes

were dealt with separately and would be either included or
excluded depending on whether the value payable to plaintiff
would be from before-tax or after-tax dollars.
Finally, one of the arguments made against allocating the
returns to the Human Capital investment which become a part of
the brain of the benefitted spouse is that there are no returns
unless that benefitted spouse expends his or her effort to bring
about the increased income.

Again, plaintiff does not claim an

interest in defendants basic earnings after the divorce, except
as those earnings would be applicable to the classic alimony
analysis.
plaintiff's

If the court will

review the manner in which

expert witnesses calculated the value of the

investment asset at the time of trial, it will readily recognize
that both experts "netted out" the effect of defendant's hourly
earnings by deducting from that valuation process the average
earnings of defendant's high school graduate contemporaries.
Since defendant's contract at the time of trial did not provide
for any "overtime" requirements, it must be assumed that the
earnings which he would receive under that contract would be for
a work week that would be comparable to that put in by his high
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school

graduate contemporaries.

That being the case, the

difference between the average high school graduate earnings for
a forty hour week and the earnings for a doctor in defendant's
position for a forty hour week would be the amount attributable
to the return on the Human Capital investment made by the marital
partners.

Again, plaintiff would not require that defendant work

eighty hour weeks in order to provide her with a share of the
"overtime" income, but only requests an equal share of the return
on the investment made during the marital partnership.
As set forth in the uncontradicted testimony by plaintiff!s
witnesses, the asset which plaintiff requests be divided is
identifiable, quantifiable, and allocable in the interest of
equity.

Plaintiff should not be denied her share of the

partnership

investment merely because the returns to that

investment do not fit neatly into the package that has been
historically titled "property" by the courts in order to expedite
administrative handling of cases.

POINT II

THE REMEDY OF "EQUITABLE RESTITUTION" FASHIONED BY THE UTAH
COURT OF APPEALS IN THIS CASE IS A SOUND AND CREATIVE REFINEMENT
OF THE COURT'S EQUITY POWERS TO IDENTIFY AND ALLOCATE THE
DEFERRED RETURNS FROM A MARITAL INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL WHICH
BESTOWS ON ONE OF THE PARTNERS A POTENTIAL FOR SUBSTANTIALLY
INCREASED FUTURE EARNINGS.
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The court has broad powers in equity to allocate fairness,
not necessarily only property as that term has been developed
throughout

the years in the court system.

For instance, in

Peterson v. Peterson, 748 P.2d 593 at 596 (Utah App. 1988), the
court awarded

the wife the husband's premarital home for the

benefit of the children to help ameliorate the emotional trauma
of divorce contrary to the general rule that premarital property
is separate.

In Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d

1369 at 1373 (Utah

1988) the court also gave premarital assets to the non-acquiring
spouse to achieve "a fair, just and equitable result between the
parties.,f
The rules in equity allow more attention to the specific
facts of each case, and grant the court far greater discretion in
determining fairness under the particular circumstances of that
case.

During the marital dissolution process the court is forced

to deal with an exceptional range of issues that result from the
marital partnership and should not be precluded from allocating
the benefits of investment in Human Capital and other intangibles
merely because

those assets do not fit into any preconceived

definitions of property or include characteristics which have
been

expected

allocated

of

tangible personal property which has been

in previous cases.

This court specified that "all

assets" and income and circumstances should be considered for an
equitable

result,

including

"potential

earning

Englert v. Englert, 576 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1978).
acknowledges

the need

capacity."

While plaintiff

for categorizations and definitions to
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facilitate
provided

the administrative

processing

of cases, the form

by that structure should not supersede the fairness

demanded by due process.

Justice Zimmerman's concurring opinion

in Mortenson v. Mortenson, 760 P.2d
expresses this fairness policy.

304 at 310

(Utah

1988)

Although there are general rules

in dividing assets of a marriage, these can be ignored "in the
greater interest in a just and equitable decree."

In Gardner v.

Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 at 1081 (Utah 1988) Justice Stewart states
that in cases such as the one at bar where the assets are meager
when the divorce occurs soon after graduation, the court must
look at ways other than the typical division of assets and award
of

alimony

because

"equity

solution" to "equalize
living . . . "

and

fairness

the parties 1

required

respective

another

standards of

The Court in Peterson v. Peterson, 737 P.2d 237

at 242 (Utah App. 1987) recognized the need for a more creative
remedy

in cases such as this one, reaffirmed

in Rayburn v.

Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 (Utah App. 1987).
In setting forth the remedy of "equitable restitution" the
Court of Appeals recognized that the parties had made a conscious
investment

decision in the Human Capital which was ultimately

manifested in defendant's greatly increased earning power.
court also recognized
sacrifices.
from

the "asset" was obtained by joint

Not wanting to call the asset which was the return

this investment

problems set

that

The

forth

"property" because of the

definitional

in many of the cases where the courts had

attempted to deal with the asset as classical property, the court
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has essentially created a group of assets or

"pseudo-property"

which can be allocated in order to further the requirements of
justice in cases involving investments in human capital.
the

concept

is

revolutionary,

it

does

provide

a

While

logical

foundation for dealing with the allocation of intangible assets
and

is

clearly

consistent

with

this

court's

approach

to

allocating retirement benefits which accrued during a marriage
as set forth Woodward and Englert.

In both retirement and Human

Capital cases the asset is very intangible in nature, cannot be
sold or traded, and is vested in the benefitted party (i.e. the
party whose contribution

to the marital partnership was from

employment outside the home).

Both assets require valuation of a

future flow of income which may or may not actually take place
depending
And,

on the longevity of the vested or benefitted party.

in some

continued

cases, realization

labor of the vested

of

the asset

or benefitted

requires

party.

the

As the

Gardner court states, concerning retirement benefits, "Regardless
of how remote

the full value of an asset is, it still has a

present value

. . . ."

(Utah

the

1978),

Citing Englert, supra, 576 P.2d

court

reiterated

that

martial

1274

property

"encompasses all assets of every nature possessed by the parties,
whenever obtained and from whatever source derived."

Gardner,

supra, at 1078 - 1079.
The allocation of these intangible retirement benefits

has

been so widely accepted within the country that they are codified
in federal

legislation

such as the Uniformed Services Former
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Spouses Protection Act (PL 97-252), the Retirement Equity Act of
1984 (PL 98-397), and the Civil Service Retirement Spouse Equity
Act of 1984 (PL 98-615).
As is the case with the allocation of retirement benefits
under Woodward and the cases which followed, in the event that
the future stream of income is considered to be too speculative
by the court, or if there are

insufficient tangible property

assets which have been acquired during the marriage to make an
equitable offset in such property for the contributing spouse,
then the court has the power to require the allocation of the
asset from the vested or benefitted spouse to the contributing
spouse at the time that the income is actually received.
require

similar

payments

under

the

concept

of

To

equitable

restitution clearly would be as equitably justified as requiring
the division retirement benefits as they are received.
While the concept of equitable restitution is more clearly
necessary to achieve equity in a case such as this where only
minimal tangible real and personal property has been acquired by
the parties, and thus are not available to offset for the value
of the human capital acquisition, the concept can be applied to
any case where
asset.

the parties have

invested

in this intangible

If the human capital asset is a major acquisition during

the marriage, then the equitable allocation set forth under the
concept of equitable restitution can take place in tandem with
the allocation of other, more tangible assets acquired during the
marriage.

Or, if

the

court

feels
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that

there

are

adequate

tangible

assets

to offset

the value

of

the human

capital

investment as was the case in Dogu v. Dogu, 652 P. 2d 1308 (Utah
1982), Gardner, supra, and similar cases where the parties had
enjoyed the fruits of the medical education for many years prior
to the dissolution proceedings, then a complete offset could be
worked out in conjunction with appropriate valuations.
Although the Court of Appeals realizes that the asset which
allows a party to take part

in the medical profession is a

treasure which is located in the brain of the benefitted party,
the court has not been led down the primrose path with claims
that we would be killing the goose that laid the golden egg if we
attempt

to apportion the asset.

All we have to do is remain

patient and allocate the golden eggs between the parties as they
are laid.

If the goose stops delivering for any reason, then

neither party receives any eggs.

Since the Court of Appeals has

had the courage to take the pioneering step, and realizing that
pioneering advances often require some polish or modification
during their evolution, plaintiff petitions this court to sustain
that pioneering effort and to perhaps further clarify the method
of allocation pioneered by the Court of Appeals.

POINT III

IN ORDER TO DEAL EQUITABLY WITH THE ALLOCATION OF INTANGIBLE
MARITAL ASSETS THE COURT MAY NEED TO REORDER THE SEQUENCE IN
WHICH DIVORCE ISSUES ARE RESOLVED.
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After reviewing the cases throughout the country which have
attempted

to deal with

the thorny

issue before

this court,

plaintiff believes that some of the problems related to achieving
an equitable solution in these matters have arisen as a result of
the sequence in which the marital dissolutions have been resolved
by the various courts.

By attempting

to deal with

classic

alimony analysis, and perhaps dealing with the child support
analysis prior to deciding the thornier issue addressed by the
concept

of

themselves

equitable

restitution,

the courts have

placed

in positions from which achieving equity under the

circumstances of the particular case are more difficult, and the
results often distorted.

As a result of the problems observed in

those cases, plaintiff would further suggest to the court the
following approach to dealing with cases in which human capital
and other intangible assets are applicable.
A.

ALLOCATE THE INTANGIBLE ASSET:
1.

rather

By making

than the second

this the first step

in the process,

or third, the court will be able to

allocate the intangible asset without the overriding concerns of
amounts previously allocated to alimony, or the inequity of the
alimony awarded to the contributing spouse terminating upon his
or her remarriage.
similar

to that performed by plaintiff's experts at the trial

during May, 1985.
and

The calculation would be made in the manner

to isolate

investment)

In order to net out the ongoing "work" factor,

the human capital asset, the base line (pre-

income

figure would
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be subtracted

from the total

post-investment income figure.

In the present case, plaintiff's

experts utilized the average income of a high school graduate who
was a contemporary of defendant or $33,600 per year.
Deducting the pre-investment income from the post-investment
gross

income

(which by definition

would

exclude

"costs of

business11 which were $7,100 per year at trial) would leave an
annual

income attributable

($100,000

less

Plaintiff's

half

$7,100

to the investment

= $92,900

(since all

of $59,300.00.

less $33,600

investment

occurred

=

$59,300.)
during

the

marriage) of the return on the investment would be $29,650 per
year or 32.25% of the gross income after required
expenses.

business

The award of equitable restitution to plaintiff could

then be defined

as 32.25% of defendant's gross income after

business expenses, with plaintiff responsible for the taxes on
what she received.
payments

To facilitate annual

changes in income,

could be made monthly, based upon the prior year's

income data, with a one-time adjustment at the end of the year to
correct for any current year changes.
plaintiff

received

Reducing the amount which

to a fixed percentage of the gross income

would reduce inequities which might be brought about by future
decreases or increases in defendant's income, and would eliminate
the need for frequent adjustments to the equitable restitution
formula

in order

investment equal.

to keep

the allocations

of

return

on the

The New York appeals court used this approach

in its 1988 decision in Maloney v Maloney, 524 N.Y.S.2d 758 at
760

(A.D. 2 Dept. 1988) where
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they held

that a professional

license is marital property and that the contributing spouse was
entitled, under the facts, to 35% of the value of the license
(reduced from 50% because of other factors).
was $456,632.

The New York court based

present value at the time of trial.
more

Thirty-five percent
the precent on the

Plaintiff's proposal here is

fair because of the deductions before

the division and

because the award depends on actual income since it would adjust
yearly.
2.
associated

As
with

malpractice

shown

above,

the costs

the post-investment

of doing

flow of income, such as

insurance or other actual costs of doing business

incurred by the benefitted spouse should be netted out.
particular

business

case, defendant's

professional

expenditures

In this

testimony at trial was that his

for dues, malpractice insurance and

other related required professional expenditures were $7,100.00
per year.
3.

As referred to earlier, any necessary debt service

or debts associated with the investment should be shared equally
from the post-investment income flow as would be the case if the
parties had stayed

together and were required

loans from the income as it was earned.

to pay off the

In his exhibit at trial,

defendant claimed that his monthly payments for such loans were
$208 per month or $2,496 per year.

(Defendant's exhibits 3, R

122.)
4.

Once each party had been awarded his or her share

of the investment proceeds, then the income attributable to their
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labor

factors should be added to that share.

case,

plaintifffs

annual

income at

the

time

In the present
of

trial

was

$10,152, although she testified that she had just become a threefourth time employee and moved to a different job did not know
how much less she would earn.

(TT 58, 17-25.)

In the case of

defendant, he would be awarded the entire base line income for
the high school graduate of $33,600 along with his share of that
portion

of

the current

income

attributed

to return on

the

investment.
5.

After the total income figures had been determined

under paragraph 4 above, then the court would address whether or
not there was a need for alimony under the circumstances as they
existed after that first allocation.
to

equalize

the

standards

of

This would allow the court

living

where

there

was

a

particularly lopsided allocation of income such as in the current
case where we have attributed

$33,600 to d e f e n d a n t s

"work

income", while plaintiff's earnings amounted to only $10,152.
Under such circumstances

the court might well find that some

transfer of income in the form of alimony, which would terminate
upon remarriage of the lower income contributing spouse, might
well be in order.

Under

circumstances where

the

resultant

incomes were closely matched after the adjustment, then clearly
alimony would not be appropriate to either party.
6.

After distribution of the human capital asset and

the alimony determination, the burden of supporting the parties1
children would then be calculated based upon the total combined
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incomes of the parties, with the relative contributions of the
parties being based upon their total disposable incomes after the
allocation

of the portion of the earnings attributable to the

human capital

investment

and any alimony payments.

In other

words, in this case defendant would not pay child support based
on the total $100,000 per year or $8,333 per month income, but
would pay his child support essentially on the basis of $63,250
(the

$33,600 he would

$29,650, his one-half
disposable

earn as a high

school

graduate

of the return on the investment)

the

income remaining after allocating to plaintiff her

share of the investment
awarded to plaintiff.

proceeds, less any alimony payments

Although at the time of the trial one of

the children was living with defendant, plaintiff
that

plus

acknowledges

the son Ryan is now living with defendant, and has lived

with defendant since shortly after the trial in May, 1985.

As a

result, an offset would be determined from the amount of child
support payable from defendant to plaintiff utilizing procedures
recommended

by the Child Support Task Force for split-custody

situations.
7.
then

After making

undertake

the

these allocations, the court could

relative

easier

task

of allocating

the

tangible real and personal property which was accumulated during
the marriage.

In this case, with the exception of the equity in

the house, the parties stipulated at trial, without prejudice as
to plaintiff's claim for a portion of the human capital asset,
that they would each keep the personal property which they had at
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the time of trial.

Under such circumstances, plaintiff would

expect that defendant would receive a lien for one-half of the
stipulated equity in the parties' home, with that equity payable
upon the first to occur of the normal lien payment triggers
namely plaintiff1s remarriage or cohabitation, the sale of the
home, or the youngest child living in the home attaining the age
of majority (which was found to be age 21 for support purposes by
the trial court).

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

paragraph 14, R 206.)

POINT IV
IN THE INTEREST OF EQUITY, THIS COURT SHOULD DIRECT THAT THE
FINAL REMEDY FASHIONED

ON APPEAL TO CORRECT THE HARSHLY

INEQUITABLE DECREE OF DIVORCE ENTERED BY THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD
BE MADE RETROACTIVE TO MAY 31, 1985, THE DAY OF TRIAL.
At the trial, both parties had ample opportunity to present
testimony as to the valuation of the human capital asset.
Defendant knew from the time that the amended complaint was filed
that plaintiff claimed an entitlement to a portion of the
proceeds realized on what the experts described was the human
capital investment during the marriage.

Defendant elected not to

present expert testimony, and was unsuccessful in attempting to
undermine

the credibility

examination.

of the witnesses during cross-

Based upon that complete record, the Court of

Appeals had no difficulty in ordering an amendment of the decree
of divorce as it related to the child support and alimony
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figures, and the allocation of income tax exemptions arising out
of the parties1 children.
Within the analysis of the facts and equities of the case as
set forth under Point III above, it is clear that the evidence
necessary to make the allocation of plaintiff's share of the
investment in human capital is clearly in the record, and an
order can be entered by this court as to the allocation which
should have been made by the trial court based upon the evidence
presented at the hearing on May 31, 19B5.

In order to rectify

the harsh inequity imposed upon plaintiff by the trial court, the
ultimate ruling by this court regarding the allocation of that
asset, and any adjustments to alimony and child support which
ultimately survive the final adjustment by this court should be
made retroactive

to the date upon which the evidence was

presented to the court.

POINT V

PLAINTIFF
BRINGING

HAS

ABOUT

JURISDICTION

A

CLEARLY

CARRIED

NECESSARY

A SUBSTANTIAL

CHANGE

IN

THE

IN ORDER TO RESOLVE THE INEQUITIES

BY THE TRIAL

COURT AND

CONTRIBUTION

TO

THE

SHOULD

THUS

SIGNIFICANT

BURDEN

LAW

OF

OF

THIS

IMPOSED UPON HER

BE AWARDED A SUBSTANTIAL

COSTS

AND

ATTORNEY'S

FEES

INCURRED THROUGHOUT THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE PROCESS.
At

the

testimony

time
and

of

trial

evidence

plaintiff

necessary
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provided
to

support

the
her

appropriate
claim

for

attorney's fees in conjunction with the stipulation by defendant
that the attorney's fees reflected on plaintiff's exhibit I, R
122 were reasonable and reflected the labor and cost invested in
the case up to that
attorney's

time.

The trial court refused to award

fees commensurate with that effort, and essentially

limited the fee awarded to her to that which had been charged to
defendant by his counsel.
efforts of plaintiff's
provided

by

researched

The exhibit clearly reflects that the
counsel were far in excess of

defendant's

counsel, including

an

those

extensively

trial brief which formed the initial foundation for

the appeal to this court and the Court of Appeals.
provide plaintiff with reimbursement

Failure to

for the costs and fees

incurred will further reduce what plaintiff actually receives as
her equitable share of the marital investment represented by the
defendant's medical degree, license and ultimately his medical
specialization.

In addition, plaintiff

should

be

awarded

attorney's fees and costs in connection with the entire appeals
process.

Asper v. Asper, 753 P.2d 978 at 982 (Utah App. 1988).

CONCLUSION

In fashioning its award of Equitable Restitution, the Utah
Court of Appeals recognized and took a courageous pioneering step
toward

correcting

intangible

marital

a

long

assets

standing
acquired

recognizable investment behavior.

39

inequity

in

as a result

allocating
of

clearly

The fact that this investment

is in human capital and vests in the brain of the benefitted
spouse does not dilute the sacrifices and contributions made in
support

of that

investment

by the contributing

spouse, who,

unfortunately, does not receive an allocation of the improved
brain power at the conclusion of the investment process.

Her

"allocation" would have taken the form of a wife ! s share of the
greatly
living.

increased

future income and the resultant standard of

To deny her the share of this investment which she

otherwise would have had without the divorce, which was found to
be the fault of the party who stands to gain her fair share of
the return, would not serve fairness or equity.

To deny her that

share because of some technical definitional problems with the
concept

of

discard

the concept of equity by placing form over substance.

Plaintiff

"property," as argued

made the sacrifices,

by defendant, would

paid the price, and in

be to

fairness

should receive her share of the proceeds without penalizing her
for the extended time required by the appellate process.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

\ H *** day of February, 1989.
HANSEN & CRIST
i

Neil B. Crist
I
Nelda M. Bishop
Attorneys for plaintiff/
respondent
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Kent M. Kasting
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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48 Post Office Place
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DATED this
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